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Abstract Data portability allows users to transfer data
between competing online services. As data gets increas-
ingly valuable for online services and users alike, the
enforcement of data portability within the European Union
by the General Data Protection Regulation will have
important ramifications for the competition in online
markets. Thus, this paper develops a game-theoretic model
to examine firms’ strategic reaction to data portability and
to identify the ensuing market outcomes. It can be shown,
among others, that although data portability is designed to
protect users, they may be hurt because market entrants
have an incentive to increase the amount of collected data
compared to a regime without data portability. However,
profits for new services and total surplus increase if the
costs for implementation are not too large. This likely
improves innovation and service variety. Consequently, the
results provide important insights and case-specific rec-
ommendations for managers and policy makers in data-
driven online markets.
Keywords Data portability  Competition between online
services  Economics of IS  Switching costs Market entry
and innovation
1 Introduction
In the digital ecosystem, data is considered to be the key
ingredient for many of today’s revenue models, crucially
determining whether a service is successful. At the same
time, the protection of (personal) data, users and compe-
tition becomes increasingly important for policy makers
and competition authorities. For example, the European
antitrust investigations against Google attribute either to
the observation that consumers might be disadvantaged or
that competition and innovation is hampered (c.f., Droz-
diak and Schechner 2016, for an overview of European
antitrust probes against Google). In fact, personal data
entered or revealed at a specific online service may lead to
a lock-in effect for users as switching to competing ser-
vices induces costs to re-enter the data required by the new
online service (c.f., Klemperer 1987a, for related research).
Hereby, (dominant) online services may benefit, but inno-
vation and service variety might be reduced as market entry
is deterred. Illustrative examples of data-induced switching
costs are provided by online banking accounts (where
switching leads to the necessity to re-enter recurring
transferals), online mail or storage services (where
switching leads to the necessity to re-enter general user
information, and to re-upload files, photos, contacts or
categories), or cloud computing environments (where
preferences and adaptations have to be re-injected). These
services suggest that a lock-in does not necessarily stem
from network effects alone, i.e., the number of participat-
ing users or complementary provided services. Instead, as
Chen and Hitt (2002) analyze empirically, there is a variety
of factors (additionally) influencing a user’s loyalty. We
build on these observations and argue that the (amount of)
already revealed (personal) data is a crucial factor for (1)
online services active in data-driven markets because it
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determines the service’s competitive strength and thus,
profitability, and also for (2) users because they might be
locked-in to a certain service.
It is well known that established systems designed to
lock-in users may hamper the success of new services and
lead to excessive rents of incumbent firms (c.f., Katz and
Shapiro 1994; Farrell and Klemperer 2007) and – eventu-
ally – to market failures. In this spirit, the European
Commission has recently formulated a general ‘‘right to
data portability’’ for personal data. Consequently, a stan-
dardized way of how information that has been actively
provided can be ported from one online service to another
is required (c.f., European Commission 2016b, p.45, Arti-
cle 20); an issue most voluntarily provided functionalities
for users to export previously revealed data do not
explicitly account for (c.f., Facebook 2018; Google 2018),
and an issue also highlighted by the Deputy Chief Tech-
nology Officer of the United States (c.f., Macgillivray and
Shambaugh 2016). Ultimately, and especially in combi-
nation with the ‘‘right to erasure’’ (c.f., European Com-
mission 2016b, p.43, Article 17), the European
Commission’s initiative aims to promote users’ negotiation
power vis-a`-vis (dominant) online services by reducing
lock-in effects, i.e., protecting the ‘‘fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons’’ (c.f., European Commission
2016b, p.32, Article 1). However, the economic effects of
such an intervention on consumer’s surplus, on the amount
of data online services collect from their customers, on
online service’s profits, and on service variety are unclear
to date. Albeit the regulation is binding for all European
member states since May 2018, academic analyses have so
far been limited to the legal and technical dimensions of
data portability. An analysis of strategic incentives, busi-
ness strategies and economic outcomes is lacking, as Nobel
prize laureate Jean Tirole outlined in his speech on com-
petition and regulation of online platforms (c.f., Valero
2016.)
This paper addresses this research gap and analyses the
competitive effects of a user’s ability to port data from an
incumbent online service or content provider (CP) to a
market entrant. Hereby, we analyze the CPs’ incentives
(not) to promote data portability and their business strate-
gies in data-driven markets. Additionally, we shed light on
the ensuing effects on consumers as this is pivotal to the
argumentation of the European Commission and the U.S.
Deputy Chief Technology Officer, alike. In doing so, we
develop a game-theoretic model that considers the eco-
nomic effects arising from a right to data portability by
considering two CPs generating revenues primarily through
data revealed by users active at their platform. Thus, we
abstract from any explicit revenue model (e.g., based on
advertisements, or based on selling aggregated user-data to
third parties), and from additional revenue streams (e.g.,
services based on a subscription model) by simply
assuming that data revealed by users can be transformed
into revenue. Hence, additional data has a positive effect on
a CP’s profits. On the other hand, revealing data bears costs
(i.e., a disutility) for users: either they have some effort
revealing data as such (say, the time needed to enter the
data), or – more general – users give away data, to which
they attribute some value to (say, privacy costs in a broader
sense). Consequently, whereas collecting more data is
beneficial for CPs, users experiencing a higher disutility
might switch to competing CPs or even leave the market.
However, users’ ability to do so is impeded by established
switching-costs and lock-ins. The ability to port data by
means of data portability arguably lifts the established
restrictions on users, but may also impact the CPs’ data
consumption. These effects have to be taken into account
when analyzing the competitive effects.
Our obtained results show that data portability is not
necessarily beneficial for users because CPs entering the
market have an incentive to increase the amount of data
users have to reveal. Thus, the ultimate goal to protect
users is not necessarily achieved. Conversely, the CPs’
incentives (not) to promote data portability are unam-
biguous if the costs for implementing a right to data
portability are zero or comparably low: Whereas dominant
CPs (incumbents) always suffer from data portability,
emerging CPs (entrants) challenging incumbents are better
off. However, as total surplus increases under a data
portability regime, predominantly due to the arising bene-
fits for the entrant who is able to generate higher revenues,
the decision to enforce a right to data portability is far more
complex than currently realized.
2 Literature Review
We refer to data portability as consumer’s ability to
transfer (personal) data revealed at one CP to another CP.
To the best of our knowledge, the IS literature has so far
not considered this concept explicitly in terms of strategic
incentives, business strategies, or economic outcomes.
Albeit, the technical literature demonstrated the feasibility
of that concept by proposing models to conveniently port
data, e.g., between cloud computing vendors. In this vein,
Ranabahu and Sheth (2010) propose semantic web tech-
niques to achieve portability and Petcu and Vasilakos
(2014) inter alia highlight open standards and open appli-
cation programming interfaces as technical solutions. Thus,
most technical studies provide a proof of concept that data
portability is technically feasible but do not explicitly
discuss the possible trade-offs for the involved parties.
In light of the General Data Protection Regulation,
which has become effective in May 2018, several legal
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investigations have been carried out. Graef (2015) conducts
a legal analysis of data portability in social networks with
respect to the (European) competition law and summarizes
relevant cases. Vanberg and U¨nver (2017) inter alia high-
light arising security issues as well as ‘‘disproportionate
costs for small and medium sized companies’’ (Vanberg
and U¨nver 2017, p.14) induced by introducing a right to
data portability. Swire and Lagos (2013) explicitly refer to
consumer welfare and ‘‘express serious concerns about the
RDP [right to data portability]’’ (Swire and Lagos
2013, p.338) because, (1) the problems addressed by the
regulation (e.g., monopoly power through lock-ins) were
legally already covered by competition law, (2) personal
data could easily be exported, i.e., security problems arise,
and (3) it was unclear how a common standard could be
achieved if a variety of different service providers were
involved. The authors conclude that ‘‘the proposed RDP
appears to reduce consumer welfare’’ (Swire and Lagos
2013, p.379), but do not offer or discuss economic incen-
tives or outcomes, which additionally highlights the
necessity of economic backing in this context.
Moreover, this study is related to two strands of the
economic literature, which will be highlighted in the fol-
lowing. First, as we assume users to be locked-in when
using a data-intensive online service due to costs to port
these data, we draw on the literature investigating the role
of switching costs. The results derived from this literature
show that an incumbent firm has an incentive to lower its
price anticipating that an entrant enters the market
(Klemperer 1989). In essence, firms thus fiercely compete
in early periods to gain market shares which can then be
harvested in later periods (Klemperer 1987a, b). Hence,
switching costs induce softened competition in later peri-
ods which allows the remaining firms to set higher prices.
Indeed, as Gehrig and Stenbacka (2004) show analytically,
competing firms have an incentive to establish high
switching costs. The authors show that these can be
achieved by (maximum) horizontal differentiation (addi-
tionally, see Hotelling 1929; d’Aspremont et al. 1979).
Within the taxonomy introduced by Ray et al. (2012), our
study deals with ‘‘user-related’’ switching costs as they
include the effort a user needs to invest to ‘‘ensure a sat-
isfactory switch of service and to recreate or transfer fea-
tures’’ (Ray et al. 2012, p. 199). More precisely, one may
argue that within the framework provided by Ray et al.
(2012), transfer costs are of particular importance to users.
To demarcate our approach from previous literature related
to the existence of switching costs and lock-ins, the fact
that we assume data to be the considered good, which
inherently determines the degree of switching costs as well
as firm’s profits (c.f., Sect. 3 for details) is crucial and
should be highlighted. Hence, the strategy derived from the
traditional switching cost literature would induce to set
lower prices in early periods (i.e., collect less data) to deter
entry and gain market shares which can thereupon be
harvested. This, in turn, is not necessarily the equilibrium
strategy of an incumbent in a data-driven market environ-
ment, as (1) switching costs would be lower in succeeding
periods and (2) profits in later periods from data already
gained in early periods would be reduced. These specific
aspects of the competitive environment further delineate
our approach from, e.g., Caminal and Matutes (1990) who
consider endogenous switching costs.
Second, our study on data portability is related to the
strand of the (economic) effects stemming from interop-
erability. Within this strand, the literature on compatibility
and standardization between different services, especially
the ensuing effects of the availability of converters as
considered by Farrell and Saloner (1992), should be high-
lighted. In their theoretical model, Farrell and Saloner
show that the availability of (imperfect) converters allows
users to benefit from other users using a competing tech-
nology, i.e., a converter induces benefits through compat-
ibility. Thus, direct network effects resulting from
interoperability are a central aspect of the depicted model.
Another important view on interoperability is highlighted
within the study conducted by Pollock (2009). Pollock
evaluates the effects of controlling the possibility to con-
vert ‘‘’software’ or services’ associated with one platform
to run on another’’ assuming a two-sided market (Pollock
2009, p.155). Thus, Pollock considers interoperability
being determined by indirect network effects. Additionally,
the impact of the ability to control the mode of interoper-
ability itself is investigated. Thus, the author allows the
platform to directly control the costs of flow of informa-
tion, i.e., the costs for interoperability. However, although
interoperability plays a pivotal role in online markets, the
mentioned studies do not depict the concept of data
portability for several reasons. In general, interoperability
should not be confounded with the portability of data (c.f.,
Graef 2015). Additionally, next to several technical
dimensions, the central economic distinction can be seen in
(1) the role of network externalities, which are not neces-
sarily relevant in the context of data portability as a user’s
lock-in in data-driven markets is crucially influenced by the
(amount of) data revealed at a certain online service and
not solely by network externalities (c.f., examples provided
in Sect. 1), and (2) the scope of the platform’s ability to
control the flow of data: since the mentioned European
regulation is binding for all services alike, most existing
online services are left with no possibility to strategically
set the amount of data that can be ported, i.e., online ser-
vices are unable to control the costs for portability.
Our proposed game-theoretic model, which will be
outlined in the following section, captures the trade-offs for
the involved parties and considers the specific aspects of
123
M. Wohlfarth: Data Portability on the Internet, Bus Inf Syst Eng 61(5):551–574 (2019) 553
data-driven revenue models. We use this model to answer
the following two main research questions:
RQ 1 How does a right to data portability affect the
amount of data that online services collect?
RQ 2 How does a right to data portability affect
consumers?
Additionally, we investigate the effects on an incumbent’s
and an entrant’s profits, which arguably influences service
variety and innovation, and investigate which regime (data
portability or no data portability) is more efficient with
regard to total welfare.
3 Outline of the Economic Model: Assumptions
and Notation
We propose a two-stage, game-theoretic model in order to
analyze the effects of introducing a right to data portability
(d ¼ P) vis-a`-vis a regime without the possibility to port
data (d ¼ NP). The market environment is assumed to
consist out of two content providers (CPs) and users having
heterogeneous preferences over the set of content
providers.
Content Providers. We consider a market with two
competing, differentiated CPs (i ¼ A; B) that offer substi-
tutable services. To highlight the competitive effects of a
right to data portability and to capture the implications on
market entry and innovation, we consider two time periods
(t 2 f1; 2g) and assume that CP A is active in t ¼ 1 and
t ¼ 2, whereas CP B enters in t ¼ 2. Thus, CP A might be
classified as an incumbent content provider, whereas
CP B is an entrant. Although both CPs offer substi-
tutable services and CP B enters the market in a later point
in time, due to the user’s preferences over the set of CPs
(see explanation below), the offered services are horizon-
tally differentiated (additionally, c.f., Irmen and Thisse
1998; Gehrig and Stenbacka 2004), i.e., users have dif-
ferent tastes for the services offered by the CPs. Formally,
we therefore use the model proposed by Hotelling (1929)
and assume that on a unit interval of length one – whereon
users are uniformly distributed –, the incumbent CP A is
located at x ¼ 0 and the entrant CP B is located at x ¼ 1
(see, e.g., Montes et al. 2018, for a similar setup). More-
over, in order to highlight the effects of introducing a right
to data portability on data collection, we consider that
services are free of charge, i.e., users need to reveal data
and CPs are solely financed by the exploitation of this data,
e.g., by showing (targeted) advertisements which is the
prevalent revenue model on the internet (c.f., Dou 2004;
Evans 2009; Anderson 2012) and a frequently used
assumption in the related literature (c.f., Choi and Kim
2010; Kourandi et al. 2015; Kra¨mer et al. 2018).
Users. Users are uniformly distributed on the interval
between zero and one. Consequently, users are hetero-
geneous in their preferences over the set of CPs. Users
patronize the CP which provides them the higher utility
in each period t 2 f1; 2g. This utility Uti is determined by
a CP’s exogenously given base utility vi (e.g., deter-
mined by the service’s functionalities, the quality of the
content, the ease-of-use), the amount of data a CP
requires from users, i.e., a CP’s data consumption rtA
(which is the strategic variable of a CP and results in a
disutility for users, see introductory examples stated in
Sect. 1),1 and the inherent preference of a user over the
set of CPs, i.e., their tastes, which is determined by a
user’s location x on the unit interval. Please note that the
relevance of this location can differ between different
market environments. To be able to analyze this aspect
formally, i.e., to account for markets with diverting
characteristics, the users’ preferences over the set of CPs
are influenced by the parameter s specifying the mis-
match costs for users (see Sun 2012, for a similar setup).
If s is low, the users’ mismatch costs are low. Thus, users
preferences get relatively less important in the consid-
ered market environment and vice versa. Ultimately, it
can be argued that low mismatch costs lead to a higher
competitive intensity in the considered market because
an user’s decision which service to patronize is then
predominantly determined by the CPs’ qualities and data
collection (c.f., ‘‘Appendix 1’’ which is available online
via http://springerlink.com for an overview of the nota-
tion used for the model).
In period t ¼ 1, CP A serves the market as monopolist.
With the introduced notation, a user located at x choosing
to become active at CP A derives a utility of
U1AðxÞ ¼ vA  s  x  r1A. See that a user’s utility does not
depend on the amount of revealed data. Consequently, the
level of data consumption by CP A does not affect the
service’s quality because (1) all users need to reveal the
same amount of data in order to keep programming efforts
low, and (2) the principle of data minimisation manifested
in the GDPR (c.f., European Commission 2016b, Article
5(1)c), makes it impossible for CP A to require unneces-
sary data. As a result, determining the active users in t ¼ 1
is straight forward: only users deriving an utility larger or
equalling zero will use the service offered by CP A, i.e., if
U1AðxÞ 0 a user is active at CP A and a user with U1AðxÞ\0
does not use any service in period t ¼ 1. We denote the
resulting location of the indifferent user by x;d;1 and only
1 We do not consider consumption-related benefits for users, i.e., the
base utility vi for CP i does not depend on the amount of entered data,
additionally, see Sect. 6.2.
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users located at x x;d;1 are active at CP A in t ¼ 1.2 Note
that the location of the indifferent user equals the market
share of CP A in period t ¼ 1. The strategic variable of CP
A is r1A, i.e., setting a comparably low data consumption
level (r1A) leads to more users being active at that CP (i.e.,
the market share increases all else being equal). However,
the profits per user will then be lower.
In period t ¼ 2, CP B enters the market. Consequently,
users can now choose between two competing CPs and
select the one from which they derive the higher utility. In
order to investigate the competitive effects of introducing a
right to data portability, we assume the market to be fully
covered, i.e., at least one user can potentially port her data
from CP A to CP B (additionally, see ‘‘Appendix 2’’). The
utility a user derives from staying (in case the user has been
active at CP A in t ¼ 1 and does not switch to the com-
peting CP B) or becoming active at CP A in period t ¼ 2 is
given by
U2AðxÞ ¼ vA  s  x  r
2
A ; if U
1
AðxÞ 0
vA  s  x  r2A  r1A ; else:

Note that r2A is the strategic variable of CP A in t ¼ 2. CP
A is free in its decision how much data to require in that
period. However, we assume that users that stay at CP
A (i.e., are active at CP A in period t ¼ 1 and t ¼ 2) do not
experience a disutility in t ¼ 2 from data already revealed
in t ¼ 1. For example, if a user entered (personal) data
(e.g., her name, address, date of birth, interests, or uploaded
photos and documents), she does not have to re-enter, re-
validate or re-upload this information. Conversely, users
who were not active in t ¼ 1 but decide to become active in
t ¼ 2 have to reveal all required data if they decide to
become active in the second period. Thus, these users need
to reveal data of r1A þ r2A. However, users may also use the
competing CP B. A user located at x who becomes active at
CP B in t ¼ 2 derives a utility of
U
d;2
B ðxÞ
¼ vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r
2
B þ r1A ; if U1AðxÞ 0with data portability ðd ¼ PÞ
vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B ; else ðd ¼ NP orU1AðxÞ\0Þ:
(
The utility function U
d;2
B ðxÞ captures the effect that users
becoming active at CP B need to enter all required data
(i.e., r2B) either if they have not been active in t ¼ 1, or if
there is no ability to port already revealed data ðd ¼ NPÞ.
Additionally, the equation captures the effects of a right to
data portability if users switch CPs: if users have been
active at CP A in the first period, i.e., U1AðxÞ 0, and are
able to port already entered data to the new CP without
incurring any costs (as envisaged by the European
Commission, d ¼ P), they do not have to reveal this data
again.3 Based on the utility functions, the location of the
indifferent user in period t ¼ 2 (x;d;2) can be calculated.
Again, the location of the indifferent user directly trans-
lates into the CPs’ market shares, i.e., x;2 equals the
market share of CP A and 1 x;2 equals the market share
of CP B.
Content Providers’ Profits. Based on the market shares
given by the location of the indifferent user, CPs’ payoffs
can be specified by defining their profit functions. In our
base model, we assume that CPs with data-driven revenue
models benefit from data entered in one period also in later
periods as the obtained information is still valuable to them
(e.g., in terms of the ability to target ads, or tailor or cus-
tomize services). However, we relax this assumption in
Extension 5.3. Moreover, we do not consider any costs
associated with the introduction of the right to data porta-
bility in our base model. However, we relax this assump-
tion in Extension 5.1. Thus, for now, total profits of CP
A after two periods are given by
pdA ¼ x;d;1  rd;1A|fflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflffl}
pd;1
A
þ x;d;2  ðrd;1A þ rd;2A Þ|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
pd;2
A
;
and CP B, which is only active in t ¼ 2, makes total profits
of
pdB ¼ ð1 x;d;1Þ  rd;2B þ ðx;d;1  x;d;2Þ  ððrd;2B  rd;1A Þ þ rd;1A Þ;
pdB ¼ ð1 x;d;2Þ  rd;2B :
Note that we implicitly made two further assumptions.
First, we assumed that CPs cannot discriminate between
old, new and switching users, i.e., the amount of data a CP
requires from a specific user in t ¼ 2 is independent of this
user’s decision in t ¼ 1. Thus, all users active at a CP need
to reveal the same amount of data (we refer to the limita-
tions in Sect. 6.2 for a discussion of the implications if this
assumption is relaxed). Second, we assumed that all data
that is transferred to CP B is valuable for the entrant. We
relax this assumption in the second extension of the base
model (see Extension 5.2).
Timing of the Game. To summarize, the considered two-
stage game proceeds as follows:
2 As shown in ‘‘Appendix 4’’, it is irrelevant whether we assume
users to be myopic or strategic.
3 In ‘‘Appendix 5’’, we show that the entrant CP B always requires at
least the amount of data CP A required in t ¼ 1 if vB  vA. Users then
only need to reveal the net amount of required data. If
vB 2 ½15vA=16; vAÞ, CP B sets a lower data consumption level than
CP A. Then users that switch CPs derive a net benefit from a right to
data portability because (1) the new service requires less data and (2)
the old service has to delete already entered data due to the right to
erasure which is part of the GDPR (c.f., European Commission
2016b, Article 17 and ‘‘Appendix 5’’).
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Stage 1 The incumbent CP A sets the amount of required
data r1A for period t ¼ 1 anticipating CP B’s
action in period t ¼ 2. Then, users decide
whether to become active at CP A (if U1AðxÞ 0).
Stage 2 Both CPs simultaneously set the amount of
required data for period t ¼ 2, i.e., CP A sets r2A
and CP B sets r2B. Again, users then decide at
which CP they choose to become active. Under
the full market coverage assumption, users in
t ¼ 2 are active at exactly one CP. If
U2AðxÞUd;2B ðxÞ, users are active at CP A and
vice versa.
Figure 1 illustrates the assumed market setting. Here,
squares above the user depict the (net) amount of data
(illustrated by symbols) different users ðj ¼ 1; 2Þ would
have to reveal in the considered period for becoming active
at the respective CP. In contrast, circles underneath the CPs
indicate the amount of data a CP requires. In the illustrated
scenario, user 1 is active in period one, whereas user 2
becomes active only in period two. Without data portability
(upper illustration in Fig. 1), user 1 has to re-enter the data
already revealed to CP A at CP B, if she wants to switch to
CP B in the second period (thus, she needs to re-enter: star,
moon and heart, and additionally needs to enter: thunder-
bolt). In contrast, with data portability (bottom illustration
in Fig. 1), user 1 has the ability to port her already entered
data and thus only has to enter the net amount of required
data (here: thunderbolt) if she wants to switch to CP B. For
user 2, who has not been active in the first period, both
cases are identical, i.e., user 2 has to enter all of the CP’s
required data independent of the considered regime (i.e.,
star, moon, heart and sun to become active at CP A or star,
moon, heart and thunderbolt to become active at CP B).
Note that Fig. 1 only illustrates the (net) amount of data
that is required by the CPs and needs to be entered by users
in the respective period. A user’s actual decision which CP
to patronize is not illustrated in Fig. 1 because it depends
(inter alia) on the base utilities.
4 Model Analysis, Results, and Discussion
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
through backward induction beginning in Stage 2 to deduce
the equilibrium amounts of required data (c.f., Sect. 4.1).
Fig. 1 Illustration of the regimes without (top) and with (bottom) a
right to data portability. Note The effect of introducing a right to data
portability is relevant in period t ¼ 2 for users becoming active at the
entrant CP B (see highlighted amount of data users need to reveal).
Without data portability ðd ¼ NPÞ, user 1 has to re-enter her already
revealed data if she switches to CP B in t ¼ 2. However, with data
portability ðd ¼ PÞ, user 1 has the ability to port her already entered
data. User 2 did not enter any data in t ¼ 1. Consequently,
irrespective whether a right to data portability is introduced, she
cannot port any data in t ¼ 2
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The results are successively used to analyze the effects on
CPs’ profits (c.f., Sect. 4.2), consumer’s surplus (c.f.,
Sect. 4.3) and total surplus (c.f., Sect. 4.4).
In Stage 2 both CPs compete for users and revenues.
Consequently, a CP’s decision is affected by the decision
of its competitor and the corresponding actions of users,
i.e., the CPs take into account the amount of data required
by the competing CP. Consequently, the payoffs of the CPs
are affected by both CPs’ strategic variables rti . Analyti-
cally, these effects are captured by simultaneously solving
and maximizing opd;2A =or
2
A ¼ 0 and opdB=or2B ¼ 0, which
yields the CP’s equilibrium amount of required data for
period t ¼ 2 (c.f., Sect. 4.1 as well as ‘‘Appendix 5’’
highlighting the second order conditions). In doing so, we
need to calculate the location of the indifferent user in
t ¼ 2 by accounting for the different regimes: If users have
the possibility to port their data ðd ¼ PÞ and were active in
period one, the indifferent user in t ¼ 2 can be calculated
by solving vA  s  x  r2A ¼ vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B þ r1A. If
users do not have the possibility to port their data
ðd ¼ NPÞ, but were active in period one, the indifferent
user in t ¼ 2 can be calculated by solving
vA  s  x  r2A ¼ vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B. Technically, the
indifferent user in period two might also be located right to
the location of the indifferent user in period one, i.e.,
U1Aðx;d;2Þ\0. We do not explicitly analyze this case within
the main analysis (see ‘‘Appendix 3’’ for more details). To
summarize, the indifferent user in t ¼ 2 is located at:
x;d;2 ¼
 r
2
A þ r1A  r2B  s vA þ vB
2s
; if U1Aðx;d;2Þ 0 ðd ¼ PÞ;
 r
2
A  r2B  s vA þ vB
2s
; else ðd ¼ NPÞ:
8><
>:
In Stage 1 CP A serves the market as monopolist. However,
it anticipates the effects on second-period profits in its
decision how much data to collect. Analytically, we use the
equilibrium results of Stage 2 (i.e., r
;d;2
B and r
;d;2
A ) to
specify CP A’s profits over two periods ðpdAÞ and then solve
and maximize opdA=or
1
A ¼ 0 to obtain the optimal amount
of required data for CP A in period t ¼ 1 (i.e., r;d;1A , c.f.,
Sect. 4.1 as well as ‘‘Appendix 5’’ highlighting the second
order conditions). In doing so, we need to calculate the
location of the indifferent user in period t ¼ 1 by solving
U1A ¼ 0 with respect to x which leads to x;d;1 ¼ vAr
1
A
s .
4.1 Amount of Required Data by the CPs
As outlined above, to calculate the amount of required data,
we maximize the CPs’ profit functions considering both
periods (for CP A) or only period t ¼ 2 (for CP B). Suc-
cessively, the equilibrium amounts of required data can be
compared. Here, it can be seen that CP A requires a higher
amount of data under the regime without data portability
ðd ¼ NPÞ. Interestingly, the data consumption of
CP A without data portability in the first period is even
higher than the monopoly data consumption rMonopoly, i.e.,
the amount of data CP A would require without the entry of
CP B:
r
;NP;1
A ¼
3sþ 10vA  vB
17
[
vA
2
¼ r;P;1A ¼ rMonopoly:
This highlights the effect of anticipated entry: Intuitively,
CP A requires a high amount of data to generate (higher)
switching costs to weaken competition in later periods (i.e.,
generates data-induced switching costs). The effect of
weakened competition even dominates the (negative effect
of) reduced period one market shares and, compared to a
regular one-period monopoly, reduced profits. The obser-
vation that CP A requires an even higher amount of data
than in monopoly is, at first sight, in contrast to the tradi-
tional switching cost literature. Here, anticipated entry
results in price wars lowering early-period prices to gain
market shares, which can thereupon be harvested in later
periods (c.f., Klemperer 1989, 1995). But, within our
considered setting of a data-driven market environment,
lock-ins are not generated by participation alone (e.g.,
positive network externalities or the functionalities of a
service), which can be stimulated by low prices (addi-
tionally, c.f., Extension 5.4), but additionally by a user’s
invested effort to enter, i.e., a user’s disutility to reveal
(personal) data. Thus, lock-in effects do play a pivotal role
for CPs in these market environments, although the
underlying rationale differs compared to traditional market
environments. This is because (1) data required by a CP
(i.e., ‘‘prices’’ set) in early periods are directly relevant to
CPs’ profits in later periods, and (2) the incumbent’s ‘‘price
setting’’ is (additionally) constrained by entrants in later
periods. With data portability ðd ¼ PÞ, the incumbent CP
requires the monopoly amount of data. Because lock-in
effects vanish through the users’ ability to port data to the
competing CP in the following period, the incumbent CP
cannot benefit from establishing lock-ins anymore. Con-
sequently, CP A maximizes its profits in the first period by
requiring the same amount of data it would require in a
one-period game, where it acts as monopolistic CP.
Insight 1 Without a right to data portability, incumbent
CPs anticipating the entry of a competitor have an incen-
tive to create data-induced switching costs by increasing
their data consumption to a level higher than in monopoly.
With respect to the amount of required data in the sec-
ond period, this restricting effect is also observable: the
incumbent CP always requires less data if users are able to
port their data, i.e.,
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r
;NP;2
A ¼
15s vA  5vB
17
[
6s vA  2vB
6
¼ r;P;2A :
Conversely, evaluating optimal data collection by the
entrant (CP B) reveals that the required amount of data
with a right to data portability is always higher than in the
case without data portability:
r
;NP;2
B ¼
16s 9vA þ 6vB
17
\s vA  vB
3
¼ r;P;2B :
Intuitively, CP B requires more data with data portability
because users that switch from CP A experience less
disutility due to the possibility to port the already entered
data. Thus, these users now only reveal the net amount of
required data which is lower (i.e., r2B  r1A  r2B), all else
being equal, leading to higher market shares and profits for
the entrant under this regime. Proposition 1 summarizes
these findings:
Proposition 1 Under a data portability regime, incum-
bents always require less user data, whereas entrants
unambiguously increase their data consumption level.
Next, to deduce possible business strategies for CPs
(additionally, c.f., managerial implications in Sect. 6.1)
and to analyze the factors influencing a CP’s data con-
sumption in equilibrium, we conduct comparative statics,
i.e., analyze the effects on a CP’s data consumption by
changing the exogenous model parameters. First, we find
that CP A’s period one data consumption increases in its
base utility vA, whereas its second-period data consumption
decreases in vA, i.e., or
;d;1
A =ovA [ 0 and or
;d;2
A =ovA\0
irrespective of the considered regime. The negative effect
on the second-period amount of required data by CP A can
be explained by the incumbent’s rationale to protect its
market share in a competitive environment, i.e., after a
competitor has entered the market: Through an increased
base utility, CP A is able to require a large(r) amount of
data in period one. Protecting this market share in period
two (through a comparably low amount of required data in
this period) dominates the positive effects arising from
requiring more data in the second period. On the contrary,
if its base utility is decreasing, protecting market shares
does not dominate the positive effects of requiring addi-
tional data in period two. Second, an increase in CP B’s
base utility vB lowers CP A’s data collection: in period one
to increase the share of users that are locked-in, in period
two due to stronger competitive forces. Since the lock-in
effect vanishes with data portability, the period one amount
of required data is unaffected by vB. In conclusion:
or;NP;1A =ovB\0; or
;P;1
A =ovB ¼ 0; or;d;2A =ovB\0. Third, the
mismatch costs of users ðsÞ have an unambiguous effect on
CP A’s data consumption: the higher the mismatch costs,
the higher the amount of required data, i.e., or;NP;1A =os[ 0
and or;d;2A =os[ 0, because high mismatch costs reduce the
competitive intensity in the market as a user’s location, i.e.,
a user’s preferences over the set of CPs, gets relatively
more important. Finally, for CP B, comparative statics
show that an increase in the competitor’s base utility ðvAÞ
reduces the amount of required data. In contrast to the
incumbent, an increase in the own base utility ðvBÞ
unambiguously increases the amount of required data. The
effect of the mismatch costs for users on CP B’s data
consumption is qualitatively the same as the effect on
CP A’s data consumption, i.e., the higher the mismatch
costs, the higher the amount of required data. Thus, it can
be summarized that:
Insight 2 A (in terms of service quality) strong com-
petitor or low mismatch costs for users reduce a CP’s
amount of required data. If a CP increases its own quality,
it requires more data in the first period being active.
4.2 CPs’ Profits
To analyze CPs’ profits ðpdi Þ, we evaluate optimal profits
given the just derived equilibrium amount of required data.
Within the feasible parameter range (c.f., ‘‘Appendix 2’’),
the incumbent always suffers from data portability (i.e.,
pPA  pNPA ), whereas the entrant always benefits from data
portability (i.e., pPB  pNPB ; see ‘‘Appendix 6’’ for analytical
details). Thus, since data portability unambiguously
increases an entrant’s profits, service variety (and innova-
tion) is arguably increased because entrants are more likely
to enter the market due to higher profits. Hence, if the
market is dominated by a single firm, data portability may
be a suitable device to foster competition.
Comparative statics show that an increase in the CP’s
own base utility has always a positive effect on its profits.
Conversely, an increase in the competitor’s base utility
decreases a CP’s profits (i.e., opdi =ovi [ 0 and
opdi =ovi\0 for i ¼ fA; Bg and i denoting the competing
CP i). Interestingly, the effect of higher mismatch costs for
users (i.e., an increase in s) is ambiguous: with respect to
pPA; p
NP
A and p
NP
B , higher mismatch costs are beneficial only
if the competing CP (CP i) is strong in terms of its base
utility, i.e., vi  vi; arguably because the considered CP
then focuses on users which are located close to it.
Otherwise, the effect of the mismatch costs s depend on the
characteristics of the considered market.4 With regard to
4 Formally, the derivative changes its sign in the feasible parameter
range. The effect of an increasing s on pPA is positive if
s[
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
22v2A  12vAvB þ 4v2B
p
=6; the effect of an increasing s on pNPA
is positive if s[
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
26v2A  12vAvB þ 4v2B
p
=6; the effect of an increas-
ing s on pNPB is positive if s[ ð6vB  9vAÞ=16.
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pPB, the effect of the mismatch costs are unambiguous: the
higher the mismatch costs for users, the higher the profits.
Insight 3 A right to data portability unambiguously
increases an entrant’s profits arguably increasing service
variety and innovation. In contrast, an incumbent always
suffers under a data portability regime.
4.3 Consumer’s Surplus
To examine the effects on consumer’s surplus ðCSdi Þ, we
compare the users’ utility accounting for the different
regimes. With respect to users active at CP A, consumer’s
surplus for both periods is given by:
CSdA ¼
Z x;d;1
0
U1AðxÞdx|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
periodt¼1
þ
Z x;d;2
0
U2AðxÞdx|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
periodt¼2
Note that users active at CP B differ with regard to their
utility under the regime with data portability depending on
whether they have not been active in the first period (and
consequently have a utility of U
NP;2
B ), or whether they have
been active in the first period, switch from CP A to
CP B and port their data. Hence, the latter group has a
lower disutility for a given amount of data required by
CP B (and thus, has an utility of U
P;2
B ). If data portability is
not enforced, all users becoming active at CP B derive a
utility of U
NP;2
B . In conclusion, consumer’s surplus can be
calculated by:
CSdB
¼
R x;d;1
x;P;2 U
P;2
B ðxÞdx þ
R 1
x;d;1 U
NP;2
B ðxÞdx ;with data portability ðd ¼ PÞ;R 1
x;NP;2 U
NP;2
B ðxÞdx ;without data portability ðd ¼ NPÞ:
(
By comparing consumer’s surplus in equilibrium, it can be
seen that a regime without data portability may leave users
actually better off. Thus, the sum of consumer’s surplus at
both CPs can decrease with introducing a right to data
portability, i.e., CSPAþB ¼ CSPA þ CSPB\CSNPA þ CSNPB ¼
CSNPAþB (see ‘‘Appendix 7’’ for analytical details). Conse-
quently, although data portability is most commonly jus-
tified by the potential benefits for end customers (c.f.,
Macgillivray and Shambaugh 2016; European Commission
2016b), this goal is not necessarily achieved.
Moreover, it can be shown that (relatively) high mis-
match costs for users may lead to users being worse off
with a right to data portability, i.e., the consumer’s sur-
plus is reduced if the critical threshold (sCS) is exceeded.
More precisely, if s sCS :¼ ð174vB  822vA þ 17ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
6658v2A  752vAvB þ 16v2B
p
Þ=726, users are better off
without a right to data portability (additionally, c.f., ‘‘Ap-
pendix 8’’). Intuitively, as we have shown above, CPs
require higher amounts of data if the mismatch costs for
users are high (because or;d;ti =os[ 0). This, in turn,
increases the disutility a user derives from being active at
the considered CP, which, consequently, reduces con-
sumer’s surplus (i.e., oCSdAþB=os\0). However, the
threshold sCS is not always within the feasible parameter
range: If the CPs’ base utilities are relatively equal (i.e.,
vB\vB;CS :¼ 447=160  vA), consumers unambiguously
benefit under a data portability regime. Additionally,
higher base utilities always positively affect consumer’s
surplus (i.e., oCSdAþB=ovi [ 0). Proposition 2 summarizes
these findings:
Proposition 2 The possibility to port data from one
online service to another online service has ambiguous
effects on consumer’s surplus. If both services offer a
comparable service quality for users (i.e., vB\vB;CS),
consumer’s surplus always increases. However, if the
entrant offers a better service (i.e., vB  vB;CS), users may
suffer under a data portability regime if their mismatch
costs to using a service are higher than sCS.
Figure 2 illustrates the possible negative effect on con-
sumer’s surplus for a specific parameter constellation by
showing total consumer’s surplus, as well as the con-
sumer’s surplus at each CP with and without data porta-
bility for different mismatch costs.
Fig. 2 Illustration of consumer’s surplus for different mismatch
costs. Note Illustration of total consumer’s surplus with (d ¼ P, solid
line) and without data portability (d ¼ NP, dash-dotted line) for vA ¼
1 and vB ¼ 4. As vB [ vB;CS, users are worse off if s[ sCS.
Additionally, consumer’s surplus at each CP i for the different
regimes is illustrated [dashed (dotted) lines refer to CP A (CP B,
respectively)]
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4.4 Total Surplus
Finally, total surplus ðTSdÞ being the sum of consumer’s
surplus and CPs’ profits, i.e.,
TSd ¼
X
i¼A;B
ðpdi þ CSdi Þ
is examined (see ‘‘Appendix 8’’ for analytical details).
Within the feasible parameter range, it can be concluded
that total surplus is unambiguously increasing with a right
to data portability, i.e., TSP [ TSNP. Thus, although con-
sumers might be worse off in some cases and CP A always
experiences lower profits under a regime with a right to
data portability, the increased profits of CP B always out-
weigh these effects.
Insight 4 Total surplus unambiguously increases with a
right to data portability.
5 Extensions
In the following, we explore four extensions to the base
model, which confirm the robustness of the main insights
highlighted by Proposition 1 and 2 and provide more
nuanced results: Sect. 5.1 considers costs for CPs imple-
menting a right to data portability (subscript F), Sect. 5.2
assumes that not all data that is ported to a CP is relevant to
that CP (subscript ID), Sect. 5.3 considers cases where the
value of collected data is diminishing over time (sub-
script DV), and Sect. 5.4 considers services that are char-
acterized by network effects (subscript NWE).
5.1 Costs for Providing the Possibility to Port Data
Until now, we assumed that the possibility to port (per-
sonal) data does not incur any costs for the CPs. However,
giving users the possibility to port personal data may result
in additional costs such as costs for the programming effort
to implement the technical functionalities. To account for
such costs, we extend the model by assuming that both CPs
face some exogenous costs F if a right to data portability is
introduced. Consequently, the CPs’ profit functions with a
right to data portability now incorporate an additional fixed
cost term F (see ‘‘Appendix 9’’).
The timing of the game remains unchanged. By solving
for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, it is easy to see
that the CPs’ data consumption remains unchanged by
introducing (fixed) costs to implement the possibility to
port data. This implies that also (1) all insights with respect
to the amount of required data (c.f., Proposition 1), and
(2) all insights with respect to consumer’s surplus remain
unchanged (c.f., Proposition 2). Consequently, users can
still be worse off if a right to data portability is introduced.
In contrast, CPs’ profits change if a right to data portability
is introduced. Obviously, CPs’ profits are affected nega-
tively by introducing costs, i.e., opPi;F=oF\0 with
i 2 fA; Bg. Thus, the entrant is not necessarily better off if
a right to data portability is introduced. Instead, the entrant
is worse off (i.e., pPB;F\p
NP
B;F), if the fixed costs for the
implementation of a functionality to port data exceed the
critical threshold F^ (see ‘‘Appendix 9’’), i.e., if
F[ F^ :¼ ð10vA  vB þ 3sÞ  ð35vB  44vA þ 99sÞ
5205  s :
Thus, if the costs associated with providing the possibility
to port personal data are too high, the right to data porta-
bility does not necessarily stimulate market entry or inno-
vation as entrants may find it unprofitable to enter the
market at all. Please note that this very same result is true,
if we would assume that fixed costs are only relevant for
entrants but not for established firms (i.e., incumbents).
Moreover, total surplus may now decrease with the intro-
duction of a right to data portability because all CPs as well
as users can be worse off. Therefore, policy makers need to
deliberately define the scope of data that can actually be
ported and additionally specify the concrete mechanism of
data portability in order to reduce costs. For example, in
many cases the transmission of personal data should not
occur directly between different CPs as this arguably
increases implementation costs, particularly as the trans-
mission needs to be secure in order to protect users’ sen-
sitive data.
Insight 5 If implementing a right to data portability is
associated with fixed costs F, even entrants can suffer from
introducing a right to data portability if the resulting costs
exceed F^. Then, also total surplus is likely to be reduced as
all CPs are worse off and users can be worse off under a
data portability regime.
5.2 Porting Irrelevant Data
Although this paper investigates the effects of a right to
data portability on two CPs providing substitutable ser-
vices, these CPs may not necessarily require identical data
from users becoming active at their platform. Whereas we
address a benchmark case in our base model by assuming
that all data that is transferred to the competing CP is
valuable, we now modify our model to account for cases
4 Formally, the derivative changes its sign in the feasible parameter
range. The effect of an increasing s on pPA is positive if
s[
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
22v2A  12vAvB þ 4v2B
p
=6; the effect of an increasing s on pNPA
is positive if s[
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
26v2A  12vAvB þ 4v2B
p
=6; the effect of an increas-
ing s on pNPB is positive if s[ ð6vB  9vAÞ=16.
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where also irrelevant data (ID) is ported to the entrant
(CP B).
In doing so, we introduce the parameter c 2 ½0; 1
defining the share of ported data that is (also) useful for the
CP where the data is ported to (here: the entrant CP B). For
example, a user may have entered her name, date of birth
and cellphone number at CP A in t ¼ 1 (i.e., r1A) and now
ports this data to CP B in t ¼ 2. However, CP B requires
the name, date of birth and address from users becoming
active at the platform (i.e., r2B) and cannot analyze or
monetize a user’s cellphone number. Consequently, only
some share of the ported data is relevant to the new CP.
Thus, the net amount of required data is not given by
r2B  r1A as in the base model, but by r2B  c  r1A. Hence, if
data portability is possible, the utility of users that have
been active at CP A in t ¼ 1 and switch to CP B changes
compared to the base model. By assuming that only a share
of the ported data is useful for the new CP, a user located at
x becoming active at CP B in t ¼ 2 derives a utility of
U
d;2
B;IDðxÞ
¼ vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r
2
B þ c  r1A ; if U1AðxÞ 0with data portability ðd ¼ PÞ;
vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B ; else ðd ¼ NP orU1AðxÞ\0Þ:
(
Consequently, with data portability, the location of the
indifferent user changes in t ¼ 2, which also affects CPs’
profits as well as the amount of required data (c.f., ‘‘Ap-
pendix 10’’ for analytical details). Note that this extension
is a generalization of the base model outlined above. Thus,
assuming c ¼ 0, the results are identical to the benchmark
case without data portability because none of the ported
data is useful for the entrant. Conversely, assuming c ¼ 1,
the results are identical to the benchmark case with data
portability where all ported data is relevant to the entrant.
To deduce more nuanced results, we solve the game
through backward induction. Due to the extreme cases
already analyzed, we restrict our analysis to c 2 ð0; 1Þ. In
summary, we obtain:
r
;P;1
A;ID ¼
ð3sþ vA  vBÞc 3s 10vA þ vB
c2  2c 17 with r
;NP;1
A [ r
;P;1
A;ID [ r
;P;1
A ;
r
;P;2
A;ID ¼
ð3sþ 2vA þ vBÞc 15sþ vA þ 5vB
c2  2c 17 with r
;NP;2
A [ r
;P;2
A;ID [ r
;P;2
A ;
r
;P;2
B;ID ¼
2sc2  ð4sþ 3vAÞc 16sþ 9vA  6vB
c2  2c 17 with r
;NP;2
B \r
;P;2
B;ID\r
;P;2
B :
It can be seen that a higher c increases the entrant’s amount of
required data, i.e., an entrant CP’s data consumption increases
with the amount of data that is ported and valuable, whereas
the incumbent’s amount of required data is reduced (i.e.,
or;P;tA;ID=oc\0 with t 2 f1; 2g and or;P;2B;ID =oc[ 0). Addi-
tionally, the incumbent’s period one amount of required data
now also (negatively) depends on vB: Due to the assumption
that not all data is relevant to CP B, CP B’s decision in t ¼ 2
now affects CP A’s decision in t ¼ 1. This has not been the
case in the base model. In the base model, vB does not affect
the data consumption in period one, because all of the data
collected by CP A is transferred and valuable for
CP B. Consequently, CP A behaves like a one-period
monopolist with respect to its data consumption irrespective
of CP B’s decision in t ¼ 2. However, Proposition 1 still
continues to hold, i.e., the incumbent still requires less data
and the entrant requires more data if users have the possibility
to port (some share of their) personal data. Moreover, CPs’
profits behave intuitively with respect to the introduced
parameter c, i.e., the incumbent’s profits decrease, whereas
the entrant’s profits increase the more data is relevant to the
entrant, i.e., opPA;ID=oc\0 and op
P
B;ID=oc[ 0. Consequently,
the incumbent may be able protect its profits by strategically
reducing the amount of explicitly stored information that can
be ported with a right to data portability, e.g., by inferring
information from a user’s action on the website instead of
requiring data to be actively entered by users (because only
data provided by users may be subject to data portability, c.f.,
European Commission 2016b) or by requiring data from users
that is only useful in combination with other data that is not
subject to data portability.
Assuming that not all data is relevant to the entrant also
affects consumer’s surplus. However, Proposition 2 still
continues to holds, i.e., if the entrant provides a better
service quality, users may actually be worse off with a right
to data portability. Here, it can be seen that c 2 ð0; 1Þ can
dampen the negative effects of data portability on con-
sumer’s surplus compared to the base model with data
portability: If users suffer most with a right to data porta-
bility assuming c ¼ 1, i.e., if the mismatch costs are very
high, they suffer less with c 2 ð0; 1Þ. Consequently, from a
policy perspective, restricting the amount of data that can
be ported may be a device to protect users. However, this
necessitates that policy makers need to precisely analyze
the competitive intensity of the market apriori, because
restricting the amount of data that can be ported also
dampens consumer’s surplus in cases where users benefit
from a right to data portability (additionally, c.f., ‘‘Ap-
pendix 10’’). Finally, it can be shown that total surplus is
always higher with a right to data portability–although only
some share of the ported data is actually relevant to the
entrant.
Insight 6 If users can port their personal data from an
incumbent to an entrant but only some share of this data
c 2 ð0; 1Þ is relevant to the entrant, incumbents (entrants)
reduce (increase) their data consumption with a right to
data portability which may lead to users being worse off
compared to a regime without a right to data portability.
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5.3 Diminishing Value of Collected Data
The benchmark case analyzed in the base model assumes
that the data an incumbent collected in t ¼ 1 is equally
important in t ¼ 2, i.e., has an identical effect on profits. In
the following, we relax this assumption by assuming that
the value of data is diminishing (DV), i.e., the incumbent
can only monetize a share q 2 ½0; 1 of collected data in
succeeding periods. Thus, q represents the share of data
collected in period one that is (still) valuable for CP A in
period two. Herewith, CP A’s profit function changes to
pdA;DV ¼ x;d;1  rd;1A|fflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflffl}
pd;1
A;DV
¼pd;1
A
þ x;d;2  ðq  rd;1A þ rd;2A Þ|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
pd;2
A;DV
:
It is worth mentioning that assuming q ¼ 1 leads to the
benchmark cases analyzed in Sect. 4. Thus, we concentrate
on cases with q\1. Note that users’ utility functions
remain unaffected by introducing q. Consequently, the
formulas derived in the benchmark case to calculate the
locations of the indifferent users can also be used for this
extension. Moreover, CP B’s profit function does not
change compared to the base model. However, CP A now
incorporates the diminishing value of the data collected in
t ¼ 1 in its profit function for t ¼ 2. Due to solving the
game through backward induction, this affects the amount
of required data for all CPs in each period. For the regime
with a right to data portability, we obtain:
r
;P;1
A;DV ¼
ð3s vA þ vBÞqþ 3s 8vA  vB
q2  2q 17 with r
;P;1
A;DV\r
;P;1
A ;
r
;P;2
A;DV ¼
ð3sþ vA  vBÞq2 þ ð3sþ 5vA þ vBÞq 18s 3vA þ 6vB
q2  2q 17
with r
;P;2
A;DV[ r
;P;2
A ;
r
;P;2
B;DV ¼
2sqþ ð4sþ 3vAÞq 16sþ 3vA  6vB
q2  2q 17 with r
;P;2
B;DV[ r
;P;2
B :
and for the regime without a right to data portability:
r
;NP;1
A;DV ¼
ð3s vA þ vBÞq 9vA
q2  18 with r
;NP;1
A;DV \r
;NP;1
A ;
r
;NP;2
A;DV ¼
ð3sþ vA  vBÞq2 þ 6vAq 18s 6vA þ 6vB
q2  18
with r
;NP;2
A;DV [ r
;NP;2
A ;
r
;NP;2
B;DV ¼
2sq2 þ 3vAq 18sþ 6vA  6vB
q2  18 with r
;NP;2
B;DV [ r
;NP;2
B :
See that introducing the parameter q has a negative impact
on CP A’s period one data consumption, i.e., the incumbent
requires less data in t ¼ 1 compared to the benchmark case.
Conversely, the period two amount of required data
increases with q, i.e., the incumbent as well as the entrant
require more data in t ¼ 2. In conclusion, or;d;1A;DV=oq\0
and or;d;2i;DV =oq[ 0. Intuitively, compared to the base
model, the benefits from data collected in t ¼ 1 that the
incumbent CP A can convey to the succeeding period is
lower. This leads to a lower data consumption in period
one; however, in period two, the incumbent then increases
its data consumption compared to the benchmark case. This
also leads to an increasing data consumption of the entrant
CP B. Please note that without a right to data portability,
CP A still requires at least the amount of data a monopolist
would require. This corroborates our insight that incumbent
firms have an incentive to generate data-induced switching
costs (i.e., r
NP;1
A;DV  rMonopoly). Moreover, it can easily be
shown that Proposition 1 continues to hold, i.e., the
incumbent reduces its data consumption with a right to data
portability (i.e., r
;NP;t
A;DV [ r
;P;t
A;DV ) whereas the entrant
increases its data consumption (i.e., r
;NP;2
B;DV \r
;P;2
A;DV ). With
respect to CPs’ profits, it can be shown that CP A (CP B)
suffers (benefits) with q\1, i.e., pdA;DV\p
d
A and
pdB;DV [ p
d
B, respectively. Comparative statics reveal that
the effect of q on the CPs’ profits is monotone, i.e.,
opdA;DV=oq[ 0 and op
d
B;DV=oq\0 within the feasible
parameter range. Moreover, with respect to consumer’s
surplus, also Proposition 2 continues to hold, i.e., users can
– again – be worse off with the possibility to port data (see
‘‘Appendix 11’’).
Insight 7 If the value of data an incumbent collects in
period one is not equally valuable in period two, the
incumbent reduces its data consumption in period t ¼ 1,
but increases its data consumption in period t ¼ 2. In
contrast, the entrant unambiguously increases its data
consumption compared to a scenario where the value of
collected data does not change over time. However, com-
pared to a regime without a right to data portability, the
incumbent (entrant) still reduces (increases) its data con-
sumption which can lead to users being worse off.
5.4 The Role of Network Effects
As highlighted in the previous sections, network effects are
not a precondition for online CPs to become successful and
are not necessarily the (main) source for users to become
locked-in. However, the utility a user derives from being
active at an online service may nevertheless be affected by
the number of other users active at that platform, i.e., direct
network effects may exist and influence a user’s decision,
but also the CPs’ strategies in setting the amount of
required data. Intuitively, the presence of positive network
effects may reduce a user’s incentive to switch to an entrant
CP because the derived utility from the already installed
base at the incumbent may outweigh the potentially higher
base utility from the joining CP – although data already
entered can be ported to that joining CP with a right to data
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portability. To investigate the role of network effects for-
mally, we modify the users’ utility functions and incor-
porate positive direct network effects (NWE). In doing so,
we assume that the total number of users active at the
considered CP has a positive effect on a user’s utility, i.e.,
U
d;t
A;NWEðxÞ ¼ Ud;tA ðxÞ þ x  x;d;t for CP A and Ud;2B;NWEðxÞ ¼
U
d;2
B ðxÞ þ x  ð1 x;d;tÞ for CP B, respectively with
x[ 0. By changing the utility functions, also the location
of the indifferent user changes. Relying on the concept of
fulfilled expectations (i.e., in equilibrium, the network size
determined by the location of the indifferent user equals the
expected one, additionally, c.f., Katz and Shapiro 1985),
the indifferent user in period t ¼ 1 is now located at
x
;d;1
NWE ¼ vArAsx and the indifferent user in period t ¼ 2 is now
located at:
x
;d;2
NWE ¼
vB þ x s r2B þ r1A þ r2A  vA
2ðx sÞ ; if U
1
A;NWEðx;d;2NWEÞ 0 ðd ¼ PÞ;
vB þ x s r2B þ r2A  vA
2ðx sÞ ; else ðd ¼ NPÞ:
8><
>:
The resulting profit functions as well as our proposed two
stage game remain qualitatively unchanged (additionally,
c.f., ‘‘Appendix 12’’).
Again, we solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium using backward induction and derive the period one
and period two level of data consumption as shown in Sect.
18.1. Compared to the base model without incorporating
network effects (c.f., Sects. 3 and 4), one can easily show
that CPs never require more data, i.e., the existence of
positive direct network effects has a negative impact on
CPs’ data consumption (or;d;ti;NWE=ox\0). Intuitively,
CP A now has the possibility to lock-in users without
increasing its data consumption. This improved competi-
tive situation also leads to CP B reducing its data con-
sumption which is beneficial to users (see Fig. 3).
However, our results with respect to CPs’ data consump-
tion highlighted in Sect. 4.1 continue to hold, i.e.,
r
;NP;t
A;NWE [ r
;P;t
A;NWE and r
;NP;2
B;NWE\r
;P;2
B;NWE, and consequently,
Proposition 1 continues to hold.
As the CP’s data consumption changes, incorporating
network effects has ramifications on all players within our
considered market. However, also our other results of
introducing a right to data portability qualitatively remain
unchanged which further corroborates the robustness of the
model: The incumbent always suffers from introducing a
right to data portability, the entrant is always better off, and
total surplus always increases. Moreover, the effect of data
portability on consumers remains ambiguous. Although
consumer’s surplus with a right to data portability is now
higher in more cases, i.e., the intersection of both functions
is shifted to the edge of the feasible parameter range (c.f.,
Fig. 3 for an illustration and comparison), users
nevertheless may experience a lower consumer’s surplus
compared to a regime without a right to data portability if
their mismatch costs exceed sCS;NWE, i.e., also Proposi-
tion 2 continues to hold (additionally, c.f., Sect. 18.3).
Insight 8 If being active at a CP induces positive direct
network effects for users, the CPs’ level of data con-
sumption is lower. However, introducing a right to data
portability increases (reduces) an entrant’s (incumbent’s)
level of data consumption which may lead to users being
worse off compared to a regime without a right to data
portability.
6 Conclusion
Data portability allows users to transfer their data entered
at a certain service to another service. Although some
online services have implemented such features voluntar-
ily, and built-in autofill features of internet browsers can
reduce the effort to create new accounts, a standardized and
mandatory ability for users to port (personal) data is pur-
sued by the European Commission for all online services
available in the EU’s member states through the General
Data Protection Regulation (European Commission
2016b). Additionally, this topic also gains momentum for
non-European policy makers, as the request for information
Fig. 3 Comparison: Consumer’s surplus for services with and
without network effects. Note Total consumer’s surplus with and
without incorporating positive direct network effects with and without
a right to data portability for different users’ mismatch costs using the
parameters vA ¼ 1; vB ¼ 4 and x ¼ 0:05. The upper (lower) two
curves refer to a model with (without) incorporating network effects
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in the United States suggests (c.f., Macgillivray and
Shambaugh 2016).
Despite the importance of this issue resulting from the
far-reaching implications on business strategies of online
services and thus on the total economy, we are – to the best
of our knowledge – the first to analyze the resulting com-
petitive effects theoretically. In doing so, we not only shed
light on current policy issues, but also highlight relevant
implications on the interface of the IS, the technical and the
economic realm to better understand and develop systems’
value propositions. For this purpose, we propose a game-
theoretic model that captures competing online services’
strategic incentives and identify the feasible market out-
comes together with the implications for all stakeholders.
In conclusion, we find that if the CP’s costs to imple-
ment data portability are not too large, on the one hand,
data portability fosters market entry, which arguably
enhances service variety and innovation, but on the other
hand, incumbent services unambiguously suffer from data
portability. Whereas such an outcome might be desired by
policy makers to alleviate concerns about dominant online
services, we highlight that end users may actually suffer
from a right to data portability, because new services have
an incentive to increase the amount of collected data
compared to a regime without data portability. However, as
the total surplus increases due to higher overall profits, a
decision to introduce a mandatory right to data portability
invokes a complex assessment. In the following, we outline
policy implications as well as strategies for services active
in data-driven markets based on the obtained results and
discuss avenues for future research.
6.1 Policy and Managerial Implications
From a policy perspective, the rationale to introduce a
(general) right to data portability is clearly focused on the
protection of end users (see, e.g., European Commission
2016b, Article 1). Consequently, our results imply that data
portability should not be applied to all online services
because consumer’s might actually be worse off. On the
other hand, considering the total economy, overreaching
goals such as the Digital Single Market Strategy (DSM
strategy) within the European Union (c.f., European
Commission 2016a) or former-president Obama’s execu-
tive order on competition from April 2016 (c.f., Obama
2016) highlight the importance of open, fair and non-dis-
criminatory (data-driven) markets. As we show that the
entrant’s profits increase under data portability, a right to
data portability may attribute to these goals. However,
these goals are only achieved if the resulting costs (for
implementation as well as administration) of a right to data
portability are low. Therefore, our findings evoke the
necessity for policy makers to carefully weigh whether
they want to promote market entry to stimulate innovation
and successively service variety, or purely focus on con-
sumer’s surplus.
If new services should be incentivized to enter the
market, data portability should be enforced strictly with
few exceptions. To date, the concept of data portability
proposed by the European Commission solely focuses on
personal data revealed by users themselves. Hence, data
revealed by third persons (say, reviews for a private lift, or
endorsements on professional networking sites) are exclu-
ded in the current version of the regulation. Therefore,
policy makers might think of extending the scope of data
that can be ported. In fact, as highlighted in the mid-term
review on the implementation of the Digital Single Market
Strategy, the European Commission already ‘‘subject to
impact assessment, prepare[s] a legislative proposal [...]
which takes into account [...] the principle of porting non-
personal data’’ (European Commission 2017, p.11). In
most cases, extending the scope of portable data would be
in line with the goal of enhancing consumer’s surplus.
However, it has to be taken into consideration that
(1) porting sensitive data (e.g., credit card numbers, tax
IDs, social security numbers) bears important privacy and
security risks, although users entered these data voluntar-
ily, and (2) there are cases where users are actually worse
off with a right to data portability, as we have shown
throughout all of our model specifications and analyses.
Our results suggest that users are likely to be worse off if
base utilities are asymmetric, e.g., if the entrant has a
superior value proposition providing the user a higher base
utility. Arguably, entry is then beneficial for the entrant
even without a right to data portability. Consequently, one
may hypothetically think of a concept where data porta-
bility is only granted to some services. Although this seems
possible in theory, the likeliness of success of such an
approach is questionable as (1) this concept would con-
tradict popular ‘‘neutrality regimes’’, which might get
increasingly important on a service level (c.f., Easley et al.
2018), (2) the current political view aims at giving end
users back the control of their (personal) data; independent
of the considered service (c.f., European Commission
2016b), and (3) the nature of the internet with independent
parties and hard-to-control data flows makes supervision
costly. However, as we have shown that the negative
effects of data portability on consumer’s surplus can be
dampened by restricting the amount of data that can be
ported, this might be a possible way to facilitate market
entry and to limit potential adverse effects on consumers.
From a managerial perspective, it has to be emphasized
that incumbent services have an unambiguous incentive to
inhibit the concept of data portability because their
opportunity to soften competition vanishes, leading to
reduced profits. In contrast, entrant services or start-ups
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should promote the concept of data portability because
their flexibility in setting the amount of data that is col-
lected rises, leading to higher profits and thus, earlier
profitability. If services have no possibility to influence the
scope of data that can be ported, incumbents should pursue
a differentiation strategy if the entrant is superior in terms
of its base utility. This arguably increases a user’s mis-
match costs which reduces the competitiveness of the
market and ultimately benefits the incumbent. For this
purpose, incumbents may try to change (aspects of) their
service offering (i.e., differentiate) to escape the fierce
competition with the new service. In contrast, a strategy
designed to imitate the competitor can be seen as an
incumbent’s opportunity if the entrant is relatively equal in
terms of its base utility and if the mismatch costs of users
are already comparably high. This might be achieved by
matching all of the entrant’s value propositions to reduce
mismatch costs which increases competition and thus,
profits (see effects of the users’ mismatch costs on profits
outlined in Sect. 4.2). Additionally, incumbents may try to
(1) infer information from a user’s browsing behavior as
data that has not been actively provided by users is not
covered by the right to data portability, and (2) require
‘‘proxy data’’ from users that is only useful for services if
they are analyzed in combination with other data (that is
not subject to data portability). The entrant always benefits
from higher mismatch costs of users and should thus dif-
ferentiate as much as possible from the incumbent, e.g., by
acting as the industry’s innovation leader.
6.2 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
Finally, we wish to conclude by highlighting possible
model extensions and limitations that should be taken into
consideration and analyzed in future studies. First, the
market environment could be changed to capture the
effects of data portability on two existing, competing ser-
vices. In our terminology, CP B would then already be
active in period one and data can be ported from CP A to
CP B and vice versa. Arguably, as the CP’s flexibility in
setting the amount of required data is reduced, CPs should
suffer under a regime that enforces data portability. Con-
versely, such a market environment would be beneficial for
end users. Second, the possibility to discriminate between
new users and existing users might be seen as a possible
model extension. However, this extension would assume
that services have a non-uniform data consumption for data
from different user groups, which may increase program-
ming efforts and potentially complicates the provision of a
streamlined and consistent (service) portfolio. With data
portability, the entrant would then collect a relatively high
amount of data from new (i.e., not switching) users and
additionally maintains flexibility for the share of users that
may switch services, leading to reduced consumer’s sur-
plus. Third, we assumed that data entered once has no
effect on a user’s utility in succeeding periods. Whereas we
believe that this is a suitable benchmark, one may argue
that the disutility of already entered data only diminishes
over time, i.e., the effects of trust for a certain service or
the possibility of data breaches at a CP might be included
into the analysis. Incorporating trust can be achieved by
assuming that there is a lower (or no) disutility if the same
service is used again, whereas there is some disutility if the
same data is ported to another service. Fourth, we only
assumed the costs of revealing personal data. However,
entering (more) personal data may also lead to a higher
base utility of services because the service can be better
personalized to a user’s needs. This effect can be intro-
duced, e.g., by assuming that the valuation of a service is
an increasing concave function of the costs. Finally, a right
to data portability arguably also induces positive effects on
other CPs, which supply independent or complementary
services, but are not modeled within this study focusing on
competing CPs. Thus, the positive effect of data portability
on service variety and innovation may be stronger than
assumed in this study.
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Appendix 1: Notation
The notation of the game-theoretic model outlined in
Sect. 3 and solved in Sect. 4 is stated according to its
occurrence in the text in Table 1. Moreover, the notation
introduced in Sect. 5 is presented.
Appendix 2: Thresholds for the Feasible Parameter
Range
In this paper, we build on Hotelling’s model of horizontal
differentiation (c.f., Hotelling 1929) in order to identify the
competitive effects of introducing a right to data portabil-
ity. In doing so, we assume that a unit mass of users is
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. By calculating
market shares, which can directly be deduced from the
location of the indifferent user, we formally need to ensure
that the indifferent user is in all cases located within the
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interval [0, 1]. Consequently, for the regime with data
portability and for the regime without data portability, we
require x;d;1 1; x;d;2 0 and x;d;2 1, i.e., the CPs’
market shares are always positive and do not exceed 100%.
As highlighted above, we assume (1) full market coverage
in t ¼ 2 for analytical tractability and (2) to analyze the
effects of data portability, an entrant’s base utility that is
large enough so that (at least) one user can potentially port
its user data from CP A to CP B, i.e., U
d;2
B ðx;d;1Þ 0.
These assumptions lead to several conditions and thresh-
olds stated next.
With a right to data portability. The following thresh-
olds for s refer to the regime with a right to data portability.
Condition P1: Indifferent user in t ¼ 1 within the
feasible parameter range
s[ th p 1 :¼ vA
2
:
Condition P2: Indifferent user in t ¼ 2 within the
feasible parameter range (market share smaller 100%)
s[ th p 2 :¼ vA  vB
3
:
Condition P3: Indifferent user in t ¼ 2 within the
feasible parameter range (market share larger 0%)
Table 1 Notation used in the game-theoretic model and its extension
Variable Explanation First
occurrence
Base model (Sects. 3 and 4)
d Specifying the considered regime: d ¼ NP refers to a regime without a right to data portability, d ¼ P refers to a
regime with a right to data portability
Section 3
i Considered Content Providers (CPs), i.e., i 2 fA; Bg and i refers to the competing CP i Section 3
t Time period t with t 2 f1; 2g Section 3
x A user’s location on the unit interval with x 2 ½0; 1 Section 3
Uti ðxÞ Utility a user at location x derives from being active at CP i in t Section 3
vi Base utility of CP i, e.g., determined by the service’s functionalities, or the quality of provided content Section 3
rti Amount of required data / data consumption, i.e., the disutlity a user derives from revealing data a CP i requires in
period t from users being active at that CP
Section 3
s Mismatch costs for users to using a certain service (affects the users’ preferences over the set of CPs) Section 3
x;d;t Location of the indifferent user assuming regime d in period t Section 3
pdi Profit of CP i under regime d Section 3
r
;d;t
i
Equilibrium amount of required data CP i requires under regime d from users becoming active in period t Section 4.1
CSdi Consumer’s surplus of users active at CP i under regime d. CS
d
AþB refers to the total consumer’s surplus Section 4.3
sCS Threshold that defines the condition for s that leads to users being worse off with a right to data portability (if
s[ sCS)
Section 4.3
vB;CS Threshold that defines the condition for CP B’s base utility that leads to sCS being within the feasible parameter range
(if vB [ vB;CS)
Section 4.3
TSd Total surplus under regime d Section 4.4
Extension 5.1 assuming fixed costs (Subscript F)
F Exogenous fixed costs affecting CP i’s profits Extension 5.1
F^ Critical threshold for F that leads to CP B being worse off with a right to data portability Extension 5.1
Extension 5.2 assuming porting irrelevant data (subscript ID)
c Share of data that is ported from CP A to CP B and that is valuable for CP B (with c 2 ½0; 1) Extension 5.2
Extension 5.3 assuming a diminishing value of collected data (subscript DV)
q Share of data collected in period t ¼ 1 that is (still) valuable for CP A in t ¼ 2 (with q 2 ½0; 1) Extension 5.3
Extension 5.4 assuming network effects (subscript NWE)
x Parameter defining the benefit of network effects for users, i.e., x is multiplied with the size of the network at the
considered CP (with x[ 0)
Extension 5.4
sCS;NWE Threshold that defines the condition for s that leads to users being worse off with a right to data portability assuming
network effects (if s[ sCS;NWE)
Section 5.4
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s[ th p 3 :¼ vA þ vB
3
:
Condition P4: Overlapping market shares (full market
coverage), i.e., at least one user has to be able to port its
data
s\th p 4 :¼ 5vA
12
þ vB
3
:
Without a right to data portability. The following thresh-
olds for s refer to the regime without a right to data
portability.
Condition N P1: Indifferent user in t ¼ 1 within the
feasible parameter range
s[ th np 1 :¼ 7vA þ vB
20
:
Condition N P2: Indifferent user in t ¼ 2 within the
feasible parameter range (market share smaller 100%)
s[ th np 2 :¼ 9vA  6vB
16
:
Condition N P3: Indifferent user in t ¼ 2 within the
feasible parameter range (market share larger 0%)
s[ th np 3 :¼ vB
3
 vA
2
:
Condition N P4: Overlapping market shares (full market
coverage)
s\th np 4 :¼ 5vA
24
þ vB
3
:
Please note that these conditions restrict the feasible
parameter range where the regime with and without data
portability can be compared in. We account for these
thresholds by comparing the regimes with and without
data portability only in those cases where the value of s
is feasible in both regimes. This ‘‘lowest common
denominator’’ delimits the feasible parameter range used
for the analyses, i.e., we require
s 2 ½maxfth p 1; th p 2; th p 3; th np 1;
th np 2; th np 3g; minfth p 4; th np 4g:
Appendix 3: Location of the Indifferent User
In the following, we show that U1Aðx;d;2Þ 0 is satisfied in
all relevant cases, i.e., the indifferent user in period two is
given by x;P;2 ¼ ðr2A þ r1A  r2B  s vA þ vBÞ=2s with
data portability, and by x;NP;2 ¼ ðr2A  r2B  s vA þ
vBÞ=2s without data portability.
In doing so, assume U1Aðx;d;2Þ\0. The location of the
indifferent user is then calculated by solving vA  s  x 
r2A  r1A ¼ vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B which yields x;2new ¼
x;P;2 ¼ ðr2A þ r1A  r2B  s vA þ vBÞ=2s. Note that by
assuming U1Aðx;d;2Þ\0, the indifferent user is located right
to the indifferent user in period t ¼ 1, i.e., x;2new [ x;d;1.
Consequently, users do not port their data although they
would be able to do so, i.e., now the case with and without
data portability coincides. We use x;2new to specify firms’
profits. Again, we solve the game through backward
induction. We use the obtained equilibrium results and
calculate U1Aðx;2newÞ. The resulting term is only smaller than
zero iff s[ smin :¼ 2vA3þ vB=3. However, we assumed
that CP B’s base utility is large enough so that at least one
user can potentially port its user data (see above). This
implies that s\smax ¼ th p 4 :¼ 5vA12þ vB=3. It can
easily be seen that smin [ smax. Consequently, proofing by
contradiction, U1Aðx;d;2Þ 0 is always satisfied.
Appendix 4: Myopic versus Strategic Users
In the following, we show that it is irrelevant whether users
are assumed to be myopic or strategic. In doing so, first,
consider the regime without a right to data portability.
Here, the analysis remains identical due to the two stages
assumed for our game-theoretic model and the assumption
that data revealed in t ¼ 1 does not lead to a disutility for
users in t ¼ 2. Thus, users do not have any benefit in t ¼ 2
if they reveal more data in t ¼ 1. Furthermore, CPs have no
incentive to reduce their data consumption in case users
provided additional data. Second, consider the regime with
a right to data portability and assume a strategic user that is
willing to accept a negative utility in t ¼ 1 to be able to
port (more) data to CP B in t ¼ 2. However, CP B would
then simply increase its data consumption in t ¼ 2 leading
to users being worse off compared to a user that is not
willing to accept a negative utility in t ¼ 1. Similar, also
CP A has no incentive to reduce its data consumption as
users do not experience a further disutility from data
revealed in t ¼ 1. Consequently, users would also suffer
with data portability if they do not switch to CP B. Thus, in
conclusion, users would unambiguously be worse off if
they decide to accept a negative utility in t ¼ 1 which is
why they would not be willing to accept a negative utility
in the first place. Consequently, assuming strategic users
would not change the model’s results as users’ decisions
coincide.
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Appendix 5: Amount of Required Data ðrtiÞ
The equilibrium amount of required data is (c.f., Sect. 4.1):
r
;P;1
A ¼
vA
2
r
;P;2
A ¼
6s vA  2vB
6
r
;P;2
B ¼ s
vA  vB
3
r
;NP;1
A ¼
3sþ 10vA  vB
17
r
;NP;2
A ¼
15s vA  5vB
17
r
;NP;2
B ¼
3sþ 10vA  vB
17
The second order conditions are:
o2pP;1A
oðr1AÞ2
¼ 2=s\0
o2pP;2A
oðr2AÞ2
¼ 1=s\0
o2pP;2B
oðr2BÞ2
¼ 1=s\0
o2pNP;1A
oðr1AÞ2
¼ 17=9s\0
o2pNP;2A
oðr2AÞ2
¼ 1=s\0
o2pNP;2B
oðr2BÞ2
¼ 1=s\0
Consequently, the equilibrium amount of required data for
CP A and CP B, respectively, constitute the profit maxi-
mizing data consumption.
Moreover, it can easily be shown that the amount of data
CP A requires is higher under a regime without data
portability ðd ¼ NPÞ. For the first period, the amount of
required data with data portability can only be higher if
s\ vA=2þ vB=3. In the second period, the amount of
required data with data portability can only be higher if
s[ 11vA=12þ vB=3. However, both conditions violate the
feasible parameter range defined in ‘‘Appendix 2’’. Similar,
r
;NP;2
B can only be higher than r
;P;2
B iff s[  10vA=3þ
vB=3. Again, this condition violates the feasible parameter
range defined in ‘‘Appendix 2’’. Consequently, within the
feasible parameter range r
;NP;1
A [ r
;P;1
A ; r
;NP;2
A [ r
;P;2
A ,
and r
;NP;2
B \r
;P;2
B .
Next, we like to highlight the different cases that may
occur with regard to CP’s data consumption to provide
further intuition for the utility functions stated in Sect. 3.
(case i) – users cannot port their data ðd ¼ NPÞ. The
derived utility at CP B can be calculated the same way
as the derived utility for users that decided to use
CP A in t ¼ 1. Depending on r2B, more or less users are
willing to switch to CP B. As we assume the market to
be fully covered, users switch or become active at
CP B if U
NP;2
B [U
NP;2
A . Please note that in this case,
users need to re-enter the already revealed data because
they have no possibility to port their data. From an
analytical perspective, it is not relevant whether CP B re-
quires more or less data than CP A. The decision which
CP to patronize is only affected by the resulting utility
which – of course – is influenced by the amount of
required data set by the respective CP. The indifferent
user can be derived by solving vB  sð1 xÞ  r2B ¼
vA  sx  r2A with respect to x (c.f., Sect. 4).
(case ii)–users can port their data ðd ¼ PÞ. The derived
utility at CP B is now influenced by the amount of data
CP A required from users in t ¼ 1. Please note that due
to the full market coverage assumption and in line with
the assumptions highlighted in Sect. 3 as well as
‘‘Appendix 3’’, users (again) switch or become active
at CP B if U
P;2
B [U
P;2
A . For users that have not been
active at CP A in t ¼ 1 (i.e., U1A\0), the utility function
for users deciding to use CP B equals the one from the
no portability case (d ¼ NP, see above) because these
users simply need to reveal all of the required data. For
users that have been active at CP A in t ¼ 1 and now
switch to CP B, two sub-cases can be differentiated:
sub-case a) r2B  r1A: Users have to reveal additional
information if they become active at CP B. For example,
users already revealed their name and address (r1A) but
CP B requires their name, address and cellphone number
(r2B). As users can port their data, they do not need to re-
enter their name and address but need to (additionally)
reveal their cellphone number which induces a disutility.
This represents the most intuitive scenario. The resulting
utility function for users that switch to CP B thus is
vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B þ r1A and the indifferent user can be
calculated by solving vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B þ r1A ¼ vA 
s  x  r2A with respect to x (c.f., Sect. 4).
sub-case b) r2B\r
1
A: Users need to reveal less data at
CP B. Analytically, this case only occurs iff
vB\vA ^ vB [ 15vA=16, i.e., vB 2 ½15vA=16; vAÞ. In all
other cases, either no feasible parameter range exists, or
r2B  r1A (c.f., sub-case a). Consequently, in almost all
cases considered in this paper, CP B requires at least the
amount of data CP A required in period t ¼ 1, which is
why the examples and intuition provided focus on these
cases. If CP B requires less data, users do not need to
reveal additional data. Consequently, they do not
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experience a disutility if they switch to CP B in t ¼ 2,
i.e., all data required at CP B is ported. We assume that
the resulting utility function for users that switch to
CP B (again) is vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B þ r1A which is in
line with the intuition of the disutility a user derives from
revealing data being some kind of privacy costs (c.f.,
Sect. 1). Consequently, the user derives a net benefit
from porting data because (1) the new service offered by
CP B requires less data that does not need to be re-
entered and (2) the data already provided to CP A is
deleted at that CP because the European General Data
Protection Regulation also encompasses a right to
erasure (c.f., European Commission 2016b, Article 17),
i.e., in the end, less data is disclosed to online services.
The indifferent user can thus be calculated by solving
vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B þ r1A ¼ vA  s  x  r2A with respect
to x (c.f., Sect. 4).
Appendix 6: CPs’ Profits ðpdi Þ
With data portability ðd ¼ PÞ, the CPs’ profits are:
pPA ¼
18s2 þ 12sðvA  vBÞ þ 11v2A  4vAvB þ 2v2B
36s
;
pPB ¼
ð3s vA þ vBÞ2
18s
:
Without data portability ðd ¼ NPÞ, the CPs’ profits are:
pNPA ¼
18s2 þ sð18vA  12vBÞ þ 13v2A  6vAvB þ 2v2B
34s
;
pNPB ¼
ð16s 9vA þ 6vBÞ2
578s
:
To determine whether CPs are better off with data porta-
bility, we calculate the intersection of the CP’s profit
functions under the different regimes (i.e., pPi and p
NP
i ).
Although the profit functions intersect two times, both
intersections are outside the feasible parameter range given
by the restrictions specified in the ‘‘Appendix 2’’. Conse-
quently, the effect of data portability on the incumbent and
entrant is unambiguous. It can easily be shown that the
incumbent (entrant) always suffers (benefits) from data
portability, i.e., pPA  pNPA and pPB  pNPB .
Appendix 7: Consumer’s Surplus ðCSdi Þ
With data portability ðd ¼ PÞ, consumer’s surplus equals:
CSPA ¼
45s2 þ sð24vA þ 30vBÞ þ 22v2A  8vAvB þ 5v2B
72s
;
CSPB ¼
45s2 þ sð12vA þ 6vBÞ þ 7v2A  4vAvB þ 7v2B
72s
:
Without data portability ðd ¼ NPÞ, consumer’s surplus
equals:
CSNPA ¼
1368s2 þ sð264vA þ 912vBÞ þ 763v2A  88vAvB þ 152v2B
2312s
;
CSNPB ¼
ð16s 9vA þ 6vBÞð80s 45vA þ 38vBÞ
2312s
:
To determine whether users are better off with data
portability, we calculate CSPA þ CSPB ¼ CSNPA þ CSNPB and
reorder the result with respect to s. This leads to two
solutions labeled by sCS and sCS;2. It can be shown that
sCS :¼ð174vB822vAþ17
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
6658v2A752vAvBþ16v2B
p
Þ=
726 can be within the feasible parameter range specified in
‘‘Appendix 2’’, whereas sCS;2 :¼ð174vB822vA
17
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
6658v2A752vAvBþ16v2B
p
Þ=726 is always outside of
that feasible parameter range. Consequently, the effect of
data portability on consumer’s surplus is ambiguous and
users may suffer from a right to data portability. Whereas
the effect of data portability on consumer’s surplus is
positive if s\sCS, the effect is negative if s[sCS. Please
note that sCS is not always within the feasible parameter
range: if vB\447vA=160, the intersection is always outside
the feasible parameter range.
Appendix 8: Total Surplus ðTSdÞ
With data portability ðd ¼ PÞ, total surplus is:
TSP ¼ 18s
2 þ 36sðvA þ vBÞ þ 55v2A  20vAvB þ 10v2B
72s
:
Without data portability ðd ¼ NPÞ, total surplus is:
TSNP ¼ 200s
2 þ sð888vA þ 496vBÞ þ 783v2A  500vAvB þ 178v2B
1156s
:
All intersections of the functions are outside the feasible
parameter range specified by the restrictions given in
‘‘Appendix 2’’. Consequently, the effect on total surplus is
unambiguous. It can easily be shown that total surplus
always increases with data portability, i.e., TSP [ TSNP.
Please note that this result assumes that total surplus is the
unweighted sum of producer’s and consumer’s surplus.
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Appendix 9: Fixed Costs for Data Portability (F)
By introducing fixed costs F for implementing a right to
data portability, CP A’s profits can be calculated by pPA;F ¼
pPA  F and CP B’s profits by pPB;F ¼ pPB  F, respectively.
Note that the profit functions without a right to data
portability ðd ¼ NPÞ remain unchanged because CPs do
not face any additional costs if they do not have to
implement such functionalities, i.e., pNPA;F ¼ pNPA and
pNPB;F ¼ pNPB .
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
through backward induction. For the regime without a right
to data portability, the results equal the results from the
base scenario because pNPB;F ¼ pNPB (c.f., Sect. 4.1 as well as
‘‘Appendix 6’’). For the regime with a right to data porta-
bility incorporating costs for the implementation, we get
r
;P;1
A;B ¼
vA
2
;
r
;P;2
A;B ¼ s
vA þ 2vB
6
 
;
r
;P;2
B;B ¼
vB  vA
3
þ s:
These results can be used to specify the CPs profits (c.f.,
Sect. 4.2).
Comparing the therewith deduced results, it can be seen
that the entrant CP B now can be worse off with a right to
data portability, if the fixed costs for the implementation
exceed the critical threshold F^. This threshold can be cal-
culated by solving pPB;F ¼ pNPB;F with respect to F, i.e., we
solve
pPB;F ¼ pNPB;F ;
9s2 þ ð6vB  6vA  18FÞsþ ðvA  vBÞ2
18s
¼ ð16s 9vA þ 6vBÞ
2
578s
:
with respect to F which specifies the critical threshold F^. It
follows that the entrant CP B is worse off, if
F[ F^ :¼ ð10vA  vB þ 3sÞ  ð35vB  44vA þ 99sÞ
5205  s :
Appendix 10: Porting Irrelevant Data (ID)
Assuming that users also port irrelevant data from CP A to
CP B, a user’s utility function changes to U
d;2
B;IDðxÞ if they
become active at CP B. Consequently, also the location of
the indifferent user changes in period t ¼ 2. Note that
CP A’s utility function and the location of the indifferent
user in t ¼ 1 remains unchanged.
To calculate the indifferent user in t ¼ 2, we (again)
need to account for the different cases that may evolve. We
stick to the assumption used in the base model. Thus, if
users have the possibility to port their data (d ¼ P with
subscript ID), the indifferent user in t ¼ 2 can be calculated
by solving vA  s  x  r2A ¼ vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B þ c  r1A.
The indifferent user without data portability ðd ¼ NPÞ can
(again) be calculated by solving vA  s  x  r2A ¼
vB  s  ð1 xÞ  r2B þ r1A. Consequently, the indifferent
user in t ¼ 2 is located at
x
;d;2
ID ¼
 r
2
A þ c  r1A  r2B  s vA þ vB
2s
; ifU1Aðx;d;2ID Þ 0;d ¼ P
 r
2
A  rB  s vA þ vB
2s
; elseðU1Aðx;d;2ID Þ 0; d ¼ NPÞ:
8><
>:
Based on the market shares given by the location of the
indifferent user, the profits of the CPs can be specified. The
total profits of CP A for both periods are given by
pdA;ID ¼ x;d;1  rd;1A;ID|fflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
pd;1
A;ID
þ x;d;2ID  ðrd;1A;ID þ rd;2A;IDÞ|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
pd;2
A;ID
CP B, which is only active in t ¼ 2, makes total profits of:
pdB;ID ¼ ð1 x;d;1Þ  rd;2B;ID þ ðx;d;1  x;d;2ID Þ
 ððrd;2B;ID  c  rd;1A;IDÞ þ c  rd;1A;IDÞ;
pdB;ID ¼ ð1 x;d;2ID Þ  rd;2B;ID:
Using the equilibrium amounts of required data stated
above, we receive:
pPA;ID¼
ð2c13Þv2Aþ6vA svB=3ð Þðc3Þ18 svB=3ð Þ2
2sðc22c17Þ ;
pPB;ID¼
2 c2sc 2sþ3vA=2ð Þ8sþ9vA=23vBð Þ2
sðc22c17Þ2 ;
pNPA;ID¼pNPA ;
pNPB;ID¼pNPB :
For consumer’s surplus, we receive:
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CSPA;ID ¼
1
8 c2 2c 17ð Þ2s
  
4c4v2A  24 sþ vA=2 vB=3ð Þð ÞvAc3
	
þ 113v2A þ ð60s 20vBÞvA
	
þ36 s vB=3ð Þ2

 c2
þ 150v2A þ 564s 188vBð ÞvA  288 s vB=3ð Þ2c
 
þ763v2A þ ð264s 88vBÞvA  1368 s vB=3ð Þ2

;
CSPB;ID ¼
1
8 c2 2c 17ð Þ2s
  
ðð20s2þ ð24vA þ 8vBÞsþ 8vAðvA  vBÞÞc4
þ ð8s2þ ð96vA þ 16vBÞs
 116v2A þ 40vAvB  8v2BÞc3
þ ð600s2þ ð84vA  288vBÞsþ 295v2A
 68vAvB þ 16v2BÞc2
þ ð928s2þ ð1020vA þ 352vBÞs
þ 470v2A þ 252vAvB þ 16v2BÞc
 1280 sþ ð6vB  9vAÞ=16ð Þð
9vA=16 19vB=40þ sð ÞÞ;
CSNPA;ID ¼ CSNPA ;
CSNPB;ID ¼ CSNPB :
Users can be worse off with a right to data portability if
CSPAþB;ID\CS
NP
AþB;ID. This occurs if
s[ sCS;ID : ¼ 1
522c3 þ 1380c2  17394cþ 28560
 ð17
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1594
p
c2  4430c=767þ 6962=797	 
v2A		
164vBvA=797 c2  183c=41þ 231=41
	 

þ8v2B=797ðc 2Þ2  ð1=797Þ

c2  2c 17	 
1=2:
þð436vA þ 106vBÞc3 þ ð2322vA þ 732vBÞc2 þ ð7728vA
4914vBÞc 20638vA þ 7208vBÞ:
Restricting the amount of data that can be ported dampens
the effect of data portability on consumer’s surplus. This
may lead to users suffering less if the user’s mismatch costs
are low. However, restricting the amount of data that can
be ported also dampens the effect of data portability on
consumer’s surplus if users benefit with a right to data
portability. Consequently, compared to a scenario with full
data portability (c ¼ 1), consumer’s surplus with c 2 ð0; 1Þ
is lower, i.e., CSPAþB;ID\CS
P
AþB, if
s\sID;P : ¼ 1
30c3 þ 126c2  882cþ 726 
ð
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1690
p
ððc2  2c 17Þ2 c2		
3526c=845þ 3329=845Þv2A
1=169ð32ðc 1Þ c 47=20ð ÞvBvAÞ
þ1=845ð8v2Bðc 1Þ2Þ
1=2
þ ð30vA þ 6vBÞc3 þ ð126vA þ 54vBÞc2
þ ð270vA  234vBÞc
 822vA þ 174vBÞ:
Total surplus can be calculated according to the formula
given in Sect. 4.4.
Appendix 11: Diminishing Value of Collected Data (DV)
Assuming that the data collected in t ¼ 1 is not equally
important in period t ¼ 2 does not change the user’s utility
function or the entrant’s profit function. However, the
incumbent CP A’s profit function changes as highlighted in
Extension 5.3. This leads to a new equilibrium data con-
sumption and subsequently, to diverting profits, consumer
surplus, and total profits.
Using the equilibrium amounts of required data stated in
Extension 5.3, we receive:
pPA;DV ¼
ð2q 9Þv2A  ð6ðqþ 1ÞÞðs ð1=3ÞvBÞvA  18ðs ð1=3ÞvBÞ2
2ðq2  2q 17ÞÞs ;
pPB;DV ¼
2ðsq2 þ ð2sþ 3vAð1=2ÞÞq 8sþ 3vAð1=2Þ  3vBÞ2
2ðq2  2q 17ÞÞs ;
pNPA;DV ¼
ð2q 11Þv2A  ð6ðs ð1=3ÞvBÞÞðqþ 2ÞvA  18ðs ð1=3ÞvBÞ2
2ðq2  18Þ2s ;
pNPB;DV ¼ 
ð2sq2 þ 3vAq 18sþ 6vA  6vBÞ2
2ðq2  18Þ2s :
For consumer’s surplus, we receive:
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CSPA;DV ¼
1
8ðq2  2q 17Þ2s 
ð4v2Aq4 þ 60vAðs 2vAð1=15Þ  ð1=3ÞvBÞq3
þ ð7v2A þ ð48sþ 16vBÞvA
þ 252ðs ð1=3ÞvBÞ2Þq2
þ ð306v2A þ ð48sþ 16vBÞvA
 288ðs ð1=3ÞvBÞ2Þqþ 483v2A
þ ð900s 300vBÞvA
 1584ðs ð1=3ÞvBÞ2Þ;
CSPB;DV ¼
1
8ðq2  2q 17Þ2s  ðð20s
2 þ 8svBÞq4
þ ð80s2 þ ð84vA  32vBÞs
 8v2A þ 20vBvAÞq3
þ ð168s2 þ 48vAs 113v2A
 8vAvB  32v2BÞq2 þ ð712s2
þ ð552vA þ 208vBÞs
 62v2A  32vAvB þ 40v2BÞq 1136s2
þ ð84vA þ 32vBÞs
þ 435v2A þ 164vBvA þ 244v2BÞ;
CSNPA;DV ¼
1
8ðq2  18Þ2s  ð4v
2
Aq
4
þ 60vAðsþ 2vAð1=15Þ  ð1=3ÞvBÞq3
ð5v2A þ ð96s 32vBÞvA þ 252ðs ð1=3ÞvBÞ2Þq2
 ð108ðs 5vAð1=3Þ  ð1=3ÞvBÞÞvAq
 ð1620ð2vAð1=3Þ
 ð1=3ÞvB þ sÞÞð8vAð1=15Þ  ð1=3ÞvB þ sÞÞ;
CSNPB;DV ¼ 
1
2ðq2  18Þ2s  ð5ðsq
2  9sþ ð3=2ÞvAq
þ 3vA  3vBÞ  ðs 2vBð1=5ÞÞq2 þ 3vAqð1=2Þ
 9sþ 3vA þ 21vBð1=5ÞÞ:
Users can be worse off with a right to data portability if
CSPAþB;DV\CS
NP
AþB;DV . This occurs if
s[ sCS;DV : ¼ 1
12q4 þ 36q3  234q2  1080qþ 540 
2 q6  2q5  39q4				
34q3 þ 741q2 þ 1520q 1045=2
v2A
þ4vB q4 5q3  41=2q2  95=2qþ 25
	 

vA
þ16v2B q 1=2ð Þ2

ðq2  18Þ2
1=2
2vAq5
þð2vA þ 4vBÞq4 þ ð3vA þ 4vBÞq3 þ ð74vA  74vBÞq2
þð180vA  216vBÞqþ 540vA þ 108vBÞÞ:
Total surplus can be calculated according to the formula
given in Sect. 4.4.
Appendix 12: Network Effects (NWE)
The Amount of Required Data
As highlighted in Sect. 5.4, with network effects, a user’s
utility function changes. Because the location of the
indifferent user changes, the corresponding profits change
yielding different equilibrium amounts of required data.
For CP A, the equilibrium amount of required data in t ¼ 1
equals:
r
;P;1
A;NWE ¼ r;P;1A ¼
vA
2
;
r
;NP;1
A;NWE ¼ r;NP;1A 
3x
17
¼ 3sþ 10vA  vB  3x
17
:
and in t ¼ 2:
r
;P;2
A;NWE ¼ s x
vA
6
 vB
3
;
r
;NP;2
A;NWE ¼
15ðs xÞ  vA  5vB
17
:
For CP B, the equilibrium amount of required data (in
t ¼ 2) equals:
r
;P;2
B;NWE ¼ r;P;2B  x ¼ s x
vA  vB
3
;
r
;NP;2
B;NWE ¼ r;NP;2B 
16x
17
¼ 16s 9vA þ 6vB  16x
17
:
CPs’ Profits
The calculation of the CPs’ profits incorporating network
effects qualitatively remains unchanged compared to the
base model (c.f., Sect. 3 for details). Using the location of
the indifferent users (c.f., Extension 5.4) and the equilib-
rium amount of required data (c.f., Sect. 18.1), the CPs’
profits with data portability ðd ¼ PÞ and with network
effects yield:
pPA;NWE ¼
v2A
4ðs xÞ þ
ð3ðs xÞ þ vA  vBÞ2
18ðs xÞ ;
pPB;NWE ¼
ð3ðs xÞ  vA þ vBÞ2
18s 18x :
Without data portability ðd ¼ NPÞ and with network
effects:
123
572 M. Wohlfarth: Data Portability on the Internet, Bus Inf Syst Eng 61(5):551–574 (2019)
Consumer’s Surplus
For consumer’s surplus, we get:
CSPA;NWE ¼
1
72ðs xÞ2  ð54x
3 þ ð153sþ 18vA þ 36vBÞx2
þ ð144s2 þ ð42vA  66vBÞs
 12v2A þ 6vAvB þ 6v2BÞx 45s3 þ ð24vA þ 30vBÞs2
þ ð22v2A  8vAvB  5v2BÞsÞ;
CSPB;NWE ¼
1
72ðs xÞ2  ð45s
3 þ ð12vA þ 6vB þ 144xÞs2
þ ð153x2 þ ð30vA  6vBÞx
þ 7v2A þ 4vAvB þ 7v2BÞs
 6xð9x2  3xvA þ v2A þ vAvB þ v2BÞÞ;
CSNPA;NWE ¼
1
2313ðs xÞ2  ð1728x
3 þ ð4824sþ 108vA þ 1152vBÞx2
þ ð4464s2 þ ð372vA  2064vBÞs
 486v2A þ 36vAvB þ 192v2BÞx 1368s3 þ ð264vA þ 912vBÞs2
þ ð763v2A  88vAvB  152v2BÞs;
CSNPB;NWE ¼ 
160
289ðs xÞ2  6x
2=5þ 11s=5þ 27vA=40þ 2vB=5ð Þx
	
þs s 9vA=16 19vB=40ð ÞÞ
 9vA=16þ 3vB=8 xþ sð Þ:
Users are worse off with a right to data portability if
CSA;P þ CSB;P\CSA;NP þ CSB;NP. The resulting threshold
can be calculated by solving CSA;P þ CSB;P ¼ CSA;NP þ
CSB;NP with respect to s. This yields sCS;NWE.
Total Surplus
Total surplus can be calculated according to the formula
given in Sect. 4.4.
Comparison to the Base Model
Compared to the base model without considering network
effects, the incumbent can benefit in terms of profits from
the existence of network effects due to a higher market
share in the first period. Analytically, the incumbent’s
profit functions with and without the existence of network
effects intersect within the feasible parameter range. If the
user’s mismatch costs are high, the incumbent realizes
higher profits with network effects. Formally, if s[x=2þffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
9x2 þ 22v2A  8vAvB þ 4v2B
p
=6 (with data portability) and
if s[x=2þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
9x2 þ 26v2A  12vAvB þ 4v2B
p
=6 (without
data portability), the incumbent realizes higher profits if
network effects are considered. Conversely, the entrant
always realizes lower profits. Unsurprisingly, consumers
are unambiguously better off if positive direct network
effects are considered.
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